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FOREWORD 
Roughly 1.6 billion people, 40  percent of the world's population, live in urban 
areas today. At  the beginning of the last century, the urban population o f  the 
world totaled only 25 million. According to  recent United Nations estimates, 
about 3.1 billion people, twice today's urban population, will be living in urban 
areas by the year 2000. 
Scholars and policy makers often disagree when i t  comes t o  evaluating 
the desirability of current rapid rates of urban growth in many parts of the 
globe. Some see this trend as fostering national processes of socioeconomic 
development, particularly in the poorer and rapidly urbanizing countries of 
the Third World; whereas others believe the consequences t o  be largely 
undesirable and argue that such urban growth should be slowed down. 
As part of a search for convincing evidence for o r  against rapid rates of 
urban growth and urbanization, a Human Settlements and Services Area 
research team, working with the Food and Agriculture Program, is analyzing 
the transition of a national economy from a primarily rural agrarian t o  an 
urban industrial-service society. Data from several countries selected as case 
studies are being collected, and the research is focusing on two themes: spatial 
population growth and economic (agricultural) development, and resource/ 
sewice demands of population growth and economic development. 
This paper focuses on one of several case studies: Mexico. In it, Dr. 
Reynolds investigates the effects of labor force shifts on sectoral as well as 
regional total factor productivity growth. He shows that  at the beginning of 
the 1940- 1970 period substantial increases in productivity were achieved by 
movements of population between sectors and between regions. However, 
toward the end of the period, increases in  productivity attributable t o  labor 
mobility declined. 
A List of the papers in the Population, Resources, and Growth Series 
appears a t  the end of this publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago Mexico's rapid productivity growth was widely acclaimed as a 
"miracle." Among policy makers, questions of income distribution and social 
equity tended to take second place to those of productivity growth. Rapid 
increases in output were to provide a bounty that would assuage social 
pressures. Income would shift from hlgh productivity sectors toward the poor 
through changes in the regional and sectoral pattern of employment. A 
neglected majority of workers in rain-fed agriculture would benefit from a 
concentration of investment in irrigated farming in newly opened regions, and 
urban migration would absorb the rest. (Little was said about emigration 
abroad.) Where the natural adjustment process might fail, through inadequate 
market forces, the government was expected to intervene within reason. But 
the very surplus needed to pay for such intervention depended, it was felt, 
upon the underlying growth process led by private investment in response to 
underlying market forces working in close cooperation with government. 
The strategy prior to 1970 involved conscious government decisions to 
postpone fiscal reform, limit development expenditures, neglect traditional 
agriculture, delay land redistribution that had been promised for decades, and 
defer exchange rate adjustment despite evidence that the peso was becoming 
progressively overvalued. Although these policies served to buy time, they had 
an adverse impact on the long-run stability of the economy and society. One 
consequence was that a growing share of productive assets in Mexico was 
coming under the control of decision makers abroad as foreign direct invest- 
ment gradually overtook that of the local elite. Another was that foreign 
borrowing was becoming increasingly necessary to fill the gap between invest- 
ment and domestic savings. 
Buying time then might have made sense if the resulting pattern of 
development had led to productivity growth that could eventually diffuse itself 
through the work force, thus raising the living standards of all Mexicans. In 
earlier decades there was evidence that such diffusion was gradually taking 
place due to the responsiveness of the work force to  opportunities elsewhere 
and the migration in the hundredsuf-thousands of those in search of better 
jobs. The diffusion of productivity growth, coupled with strong demand 
growth, had caused an impressive shift in the regional and sectoral structure of 
employment. In this paper, the so-called "shift factor" is studied from 1940 to  
1970. The findings are analyzed in terms of their consequences for overall 
productivity growth, employment, and social welfare. Placed in the context 
of  accelerating demographic growth and subsequent growth in the number of 
job seekers, the study asks the question whether o r  not the shift factor was 
sufficient for Mexico's sectorally and regionally unbalanced productivity 
growth to become more balanced. 
In 1976 the incoming administration of Lopez Portillo inherited both the 
problems and promises of its predecessors. The recent prospects of a petroleum 
export bonanza have forestalled, if not eliminated, many of the problems while 
greatly accelerating expectations. The success with which Mexico's goals of 
growth and equity may be reconciled in coming years will depend on the level 
and composition of future productivity growth of the economy as much as on 
the political skill with which the surplus of petroleum is apportioned among 
competing interest groups. In dealing with recent regional and sectoral trends 
in productivity, it is hoped that this study will contribute to the achievement 
of  Mexico's future goals of employment, growth, and social welfare. It is also 
hoped that the paper sheds light on the importance to  Mexico's internal 
stability and growth of links with the United States. 
The following chapters deal respectively with ( I )  proximate sources of 
productivity growth in Mexico from 1940 to 1970; (2) the methodology used 
in the shift-share analysis of total factor productivity growth; (3) a shift-share 
analysis of total factor productivity growth in the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary sectors from 1940 to 1970; (4) a shift-share analysis of total factor 
productivity growth from 1940 to  1970 in the six main areas of Mexico: 
North, Gulf, North Pacific, South Pacific, Metropolitan Mexico City, and Rest 
of  Center; (5) a shift-share analysis of productivity growth from 1940 to 1970 
in the three main regions: Border, Metropolitan Mexico City, and Rest of 
Mexico; and (6) a shift-share analysis of the primary, secondary and tertiary 
sectors of the three main regions of Mexico from 1940 to 1970. 
The following analysis was made possible as part of the program of the 
Mexico Task Force of IIASA's Human Settlements and Services Area and is 
believed to  have relevance well beyond the Mexican case.' 
1 PROXIMATE SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN 
MEXICO FROM 1940 TO 1970 
In a recent paper, Professor Ansley Code of Princeton University in the USA 
commented that Mexico had astonished the world with its sustained rapid pro- 
ductivity growth since 1955, despite increased fertility rates and accelerating 
population growth. He suggested that its recent economic performance might 
have been even better had demographic pressures been alleviated beginning in 
the mid-1950s rather than two decades later. He also predicted that the wave 
of job seekers generated by past population growth will flow forward into the 
labor force for at least another generation (Coale 1978). In order to assess the 
impact of increased labor supply on the level and diffusion of productivity 
gains, an analysis is made first of net productivity growth at the national level 
(Chapter 1) and then of sectoral and regional productivity growth (Chapters 
3-6). The findings offer striking support for Professor Coale's hypothesis and 
have sober implications for government policies as well as for the level and pat- 
tern of private expenditures if goals of growth and income distribution are to 
be made consistent with accelerated expansion of the work force. 
MEASURING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
In this section we present new calculations of total factor productivity growth 
in Mexico from 1940 to 1975 based on the most recent available information 
on output and input of labor, capital, and land. The objective is to determine 
how total factor productivity has grown during periods of quite different 
patterns of employment and investment, government policy, and land use. The 
stress is on productivity growth as an essential element in the improvements of 
standards of living. The relationship between total factor productivity, labor 
productivity, and employment is crucial to the distribution of gains throughout 
the work force. But the first step is to determine whether output has continued 
to rise relative to all factor inputs, including capital and land. The basis of the 
calculations is a simplified "Denison production function" (Denison 1962) in 
which output is expressed as a function of labor (L), capital (K), land (R), and 
a total factor productivity term (eT). Thus, Y = e T ~ ~ K b R C  such that the 
logarithmic relationship Y = T + a i  + b~ + CR permits one to use information 
on observed growth of the respective inputs of labor, capital, and land and on 
observed growth of output to  derive the "unexplained residual" of total factor 
productivity (T), such that 
Inputs L, K, and R are weighted according to the assumptions of a Cobb- 
Douglas production functionZ in which case the constant returns to scale 
property ensures that the output elasticity coefficients with respect to each 
input (a, b ,  and c ,  respectively) sum to unity. Each coefficient represents the 
respective share of that factor in value added. Hence, we can use observed 
shares of value added in gross domestic product (GDP) accruing to each 
factor to represent that factor's elasticity of output a ,  b,  or c. For example, if 
the share of labor income represents 60 percent of GDP, then the coefficient 
for labor inputs is assumed to be 0.6. For purposes of the following calcu- 
lations, the factor shares applied to the Mexican case are3 
a = labor share = 0.60 
b = capital share = 0.35 
c  = land rent share = 0.05 
Growth of output is taken from the Bank of Mexico's GDP estimates 
expressed in constant prices. These figures are published in Bank of Mexico 
(1960-1976).4 
Growth of the labor force is based on man-years of labor uncorrected for 
age, sex, skill, or degree of unemployment or underemployment, drawing upon 
census figures for the economically active population over 12 years of age (PEA) 
for the years 1940, 1950, and 1970. For 1960 major adjustments to  the census 
figures were made by Altimir (1974), reducing the PEA by slightly over one 
million workers.' 
The capital stock indexes for 1960 onward are calculated as follows. An 
initial capital stock is assumed, a hypothetical rate of depreciation is applied, 
and current gross investment (in constant) prices are added in order to  derive 
the capital stock (K) a t  the end of the year (Table 
In Table 2, proximate sources of productivity growth in the national 
economy are estimated in order to determine the residual attributable to 
increased total factor productivity.7 Productivity gains at the national level, 
after rising steadily from the 1940s through the mid-1 960s, have since sharply 
reversed their trend. The unexplained residual, which is a surrogate for net 
productivity growth in the economy, fell from a high of 3.4 percent per annum 
in the period 1960-65 to 2.9 percent per annum in the second half of the 
decade and further declined to  1.6 percent per annum in the 1970-75 period. 
This trend primarily reflects higher growth rates of labor and capital inputs in 
TABLE 1 Capital stock estimates for the relevant years used in the produc- 
tivity calculations. 
Gross 
Gross Gross Capital domestic 
investment investmentb stock product 
(million I K Y Capital/ 
current (million 1960 (million 1960 (million 1960 output 
pesos)" pesos) pesos) pesos) Kt -1 /Yt 
At the official exchange rate a current peso in 1978 was worth about US$0.045. On a purchasing 
power parity basis a 1960 peso would be worth about ~ S $ 0 . 2 5  (1978) value and a 1950 peso would be 
worth about US$O.SO today. 
* Converted from current values using implicit GDP inflator. Figures for 1972 to 1975 are from 
Fitzgerald (1977b) expressed as percentages of GDP, applied to 1960 value GDP estimates of the Bank of 
Mexico for the same years. 
lnterpolated for 1963, 1964. 
Raymond Goldsmith (1966) estimated the physical capital stock ("structures and equipment") for 
1960 to be 250000 current pesos (cited in Reynolds 1970, Appendix Table D.8,0.383). 
SOURCES: The initial capital stock figure as well as the current value figures for gross investment 
1 9 6 0 4 2  were taken from Reynolds (1970, p. 7.9). Gross investment figures for 1965-71 in current 
values are from Fitzgerald (1977a) Table 11. For 1972-75 (from Fitzgerald 1977a), investment percentages 
of GDP are applied to GDP fgures from Bank of Mexico official estimates to derive gross investment 
estimates. The method of calculation of K is described in the text. 
contrast to  slower growth rates of output in recent years. Since both the eco- 
nomic constraints on the ability of government to respond to social pressures 
and the capacity of the market to transmit productivity gains from leading to 
lagging sectors depend on net productivity growth, ttus is an alarming trend. It 
suggests that the Mexican economy may have reached a watershed in the mid- 
1960s, such that the previous pattern of development described earlier 
(Reynolds 1970) is now giving way to a new set of structural forces that will 
TABLE 2 Proximate sources of  productivity growth in the  Mexican economy, 
1940-70 (compound annual rates of  growth). 
OUTPUT 
1. Gross Domestic 5.8 5.9 6.8 6.9 6.7 5.5 
Producta (7.21~ 
INPUT 
2. Man years of 3.5 2.0 2.4 (2.41~ (2 .41~ (2 .5)d 
LaborC 
3. Stock of Fixed 
Reproducible 2.8 5.5 6.0 5.3 6.7 6.7 
Assets 
4. Hectares of 
Land in 3.6 1 .O 2.1 3.2 - 0.5 (2.0p 
Cultivation 
5. Rate of Growth 
Attributable 
to Inputs 2 , 3  3.3 3.2 3.6 3.5 
and 4 abovee 
6. Rate of Growth 
Unexplained by 
Above Inputs 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.4 2.9 ( 1 . 6 ) ~  
("Unexplained 
residual") 
a The compound rates of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) for the periods 1940-50 and 
1950-60 are based on GDP estimates used by Unikel(1976) and Appendini (1974 and private communi- 
cation) in million 1950 pesos (1940: 22 889; 1950: 41 060; 1960: 74 215). These are taken from Solis 
(1970) and may be compared with other Bank of Mexico estimates used in Reynolds (1970) for 1940 in 
1950 pesos: 21 658; 1950: 41 060; 1960: 74 317. 
Unikel's figure for 1970 is 152 341 which implies a rate of growth for 1960-70 of 7.2 percent per 
annum. However, the latest Bank of Mexico data (in million 1960 pesos) as cited in Table 1, imply a 
lower growth rate for 1960s of 6.8 percent per annum. Note that regional and national shift-share esti- 
mates of subsequent sections employ the Unikel-Appendini GDP estimates (in 1950 pesos), so that they 
almost certainly bias upward productivity growth during that decade. 
Based on economically active population (PEA) reported in the census for those 12 years of age and 
over for 1940: 5858 X 10'; 1950: 8345 X 10'; 1970: 12955 X 10'. .e 1960 census figure for PEA 
(1 1253 X lo3) was rejected in favor of the downward adjustment by Altimir: 10 213 X lo3. The growth 
of PEA for 1950-60 based on Altimir's adjustment is 2.0 percent per annum and that for 1960-70 is 
2.4 percent per annum. On the basis of the official 1960 census fgures for PEA the growth for the 
1950s rises to 3.1 percent per annum and that of the 1960s falls to 1.4 percent per annum (too low 
and too high respectively, see text). 
Estimate based on extrapolation of trends (land and labor, 1975) or interpolation (labor, 1965). 
The weights used were labor (0.60), capital (0.35), and land (0.05). compared to Reynold's (1970) 
weights 0.66, 0.29, and 0.05 respectively which would give residuals of 1940-50: 2.5 percent per annum; 
1950-60: 2.9 percent per annum; and 1960-70: 3.4 percent per annum. For the form of production 
function used see page 4. The factor shares applied in Table 2 reflect subjective considerations of under- 
lying factor productivities in the absence of distortions in relative prices, subsidies, and other policies 
which bias upward the share of profits, interest, and quasi-rent. The actual labor share of GDP during the 
period was probably closer to 30 percent, while the capital share, including mixed income of owner- 
operated farm and nonfarm enterprises and depreciation allowances, was about 65 percent of GDP. The 
imply slower output growth per unit of input.9 Since this process of deceler- 
ation is occurring precisely at the time when pressures are mounting for wage 
increases, greater social outlays, more equitable agrarian policies, and other 
reform measures, an analysis of the factors underlying productivity 
growth is especially timely. Also the acceleration in demographic growth 
and urbanization in recent decades places a growing demand on the economy 
to absorb new entrants into the work force, exacerbating the problems caused 
by declining rates of output growth. 
The preceding examination of productivity trends suggests that rapid 
expansion of the work force may have begun to place a significant drag on 
productivity growth as early as the mid-1960s. The turnaround in the "residual" 
reflecting net factor productivity growth may be due to  the onset of diminish- 
ing marginal productivity of labor as growth in the supply of available workers 
began to outstrip demand growth. This is supportive of the suggestions by 
Coale (1978) that acceleration in population growth since 1940 would, with a 
lag, lead to  a lower rate of productivity growth and social progress than would 
have been obtained under more moderate demographic conditions. The more 
detailed shift-share analysis of the following chapters provides additional evi- 
dence to  support this conclusion. 
Although both output and productivity growth have decelerated in the 
past decade, Mexico's rate of investment has continued to expand as shown in 
Table 3. 
The investment share of GDP has risen progressively since 1940 as has the 
internal rate of savings, which in the 1970s was almost double that of the 
1940s. Investment opportunities appear to have increasingly outstripped 
domestic savings capacity, leading to a growth of foreign borrowing. External 
borrowing (imports minus exports) has risen sharply as a share of GDP, from 0.2 
percent in the 1940s to  1.8 percent and 3.1 percent in the 1960s and 1970s, 
respectively. As a share of total investment, external borrowing rose from under 
2 percent in the 1950s to  10 percent in the 1960s and 15 percent in the 1970s. 
This is consistent with evidence that net productivity growth is decelerating, 
implying that the domestic surplus available for saving and investment is 
expanding at a lower rate, forcing increased dependence on foreign borrowing 
and foreign direct investment. 
In Latin America total government expenditure hasrisen as a share of GDP 
in recent years. Mexico remains below the average as shown in Table 4 below. 
land rent share was about 5 percent of GDP. If these observed shares were used to weight inputs, produc 
tivity residuals would be 2.8 percent per annum for the 1940s, 1.7 percent per annum for the 1950s, and 
2.1 percent per annum for the 1960s. For the period 1 9 6 M 5  productivity growth wouId be 2.6 percent 
per annum, 1965-1970 would be 1.7 percent per annum, and 1970-75 would be 0.3 percent per annum, 
sharpening the downtrend in productivity growth observed in recent years. 
Notes on sources and methods: Land inputs are derived from figures in Hewitt (1976) for total cropland 
of Mexico for 1960 and 1970 .qar l i e r  years are from Reynolds (1970). The figures from Hewitt (1976) 
for total hectares cuItivated are 7934 x lo3 for 1940, 10 753 X lo3  for 1950, 12239  X l o 3  for 1960, and 
15 128 X l o 3  for 1970. 
TABLE 3 Rates of investment and saving in Mexico (as a percentage of GDP). 
Gross fmed capital formation Gross saving 
Aver age public private total internal external total 
SOURCE: Fitzgerald (1977a, p. 50). 
TABLE 4 Public sector expenditure in Latin America, 1960-70 (as percentage 
of GDP). 







All Latin Americaa 
a Average weighted by GDP in 1960. 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America, cited in Fitzgerald (1978, p. 9) .  




Current account surplus 
Capital expenditure: GDCF 
Other 
Total capital expenditure 
Total expenditure 
Total deficit 
a Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
SOURCE: Fitzgerald (1978, p.  14). 
The federal government, by far the dominant fiscal entity, has pro- 
gressively increased both its current and capital expenditure shares, whle  the 
current account surplus is declining (Table 5). Although tax shares of GDP have 
risen, they have not grown as fast as current expenditures. Thus burgeoning 
capital formation of the public sector has increasingly been financed out of 
government borrowing from the financial sector, foreign credits, and an 
"inflation tax" on the private sector, reflecting Central Bank discounting of 
otherwise unfunded fiscal deficits. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter indicates that in terms of total factor productivity growth at  the 
national level, Mexico was losing ground by the 1970s with consequences for 
both private and public sector savings and investment. While increased rates of 
investment would be required to  sustain the rate of output growth, the surplus 
needed to finance that investment was decelerating, even as social pressures for 
income redistribution increased. In the following chapters, an analysis is made 
of the underlying patterns of productivity growth by sector and region in order 
t o  determine some of the proximate causes of declining productivity growth. 
2 METHODOLOGY USED IN THE SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS O F  
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
An important share of overall productivity growth in Mexico has been associ- 
ated with a continuing s h f t  of the labor force from lower to  higher produc- 
tivity occupations. This shift has occurred within production sectors, among 
sectors, and between regions of the economy, as well as from rural to  urban 
areas. In an earlier work (Reynolds 1970), a measurement was made of the 
relative contribution of shifts of labor among the three main sectors o f  the 
economy - primary (agriculture, cattle, forestry, fishing), secondary (manu- 
facturing, mining, petroleum, electricity), and tertiary (transport, communi- 
cations, commerce, government, other services), - for the two decades since 
1940. Subsequently, these calculations a t  the national level were updated to  
include the 1960s (Reynolds 1977). I t  is now possible to extend this analysis 
t o  the regional level permitting productivity growth t o  be linked to  internal 
migration. T o  do  t h s ,  shft-share analysis is applied t o  the main regions of the 
economy as well as t o  intra-regional shifts among the three production sectors 
for the three decades from 1940 to  1970. T h s  permits one t o  determine the 
secular pattern o f  output,  employment, and total factor productivity growth 
(increase in value added per worker) in response to changing market conditions 
and government policy. Extending the shift-share analysis to  the regional level, 
first to  six areas (North, Gulf, North Pacific, South Pacific, Metropolitan 
Mexico City, and Rest of Center), then t o  three regions (the Border States, 
Metropolitan Mexico City, and Rest of Mexico), substantially increases the use- 
fulness of the analysis since major migratory trends can be taken into consider- 
ation. Trends in agricultural and tertiary sector productivity show sharp regional 
differentials as d o  related patterns of migration and employment.10 
The method of estimating the shft-share component of total factor 
productivity growth is relatively straightforward. It takes advantage of the fact 
that  growth in value added per worker in the economy as a whole (or in any 
region o f  the economy) is the sum of increases in output per worker multiplied 
by initial employment in the subsectors, plus the increase in sectoral 
employment multiplied by initial output per worker in the subsectors, plus the 
cross products. 
The model is as follows:" 
where Yij value added in sector or  region i in period j, where i = 1, . . . , n; 
Nij = employment in sector i in period j, where i = 1, . . . , n ;  and T total 
economy. Let 
A Yl/NI ; a -NI /NT 
Z = Yn/Nn ; Z Nn/NT 
and let t = period t ;  and let t + j be the period t plus j periods; and let A 
change from period t to  period t + j; then 
YT(t +j)/NT(t + j )  = (A, +AA)(at + A a ) +  (B, + AB)(b, + A b )  
+ . . . + (2, + AZ)(z, + Az) ( 5 )  
YT(t + j)/NT(t + j) = Ata t  + AAa, + A,Aa + AAAa + B,b, + ABb, 
+ B,Ab + ABAb + . . . + Z,z, +AZz, + Z,Az + AZAz (6) 
therefore 
YT(t+j)/NT(t +I)-YTt/NTt = AYT/NT = AAa, +A,Aa +AAAa  
+ ABb, + B,Ab + ABAb + . . . + AZz, + Z,Az + AZAz (7) 
This change can be divided into the own sectoral (or regional) productivity 
growth component, the intersectoral (or interregional) shift component, and 
the combined elements as follows: 
own sectoral (or 
regional) factors 
e 




+ A d ,  + AbB, + .  . . + AzZ, 
combined factors 
+ AAAa + ABAb + . . . + AZAz (8) 
The model may be used to estimate the effects on productivity of the 
country as a whole from shifts in labor among sectors with different average 
productivities (shift factor) as distinct from the changes in total output per 
worker resulting from productivity growth within each sector (own factor). 
The term "total factor productivity" reflects the fact that the numerator (value 
added) represents the return to all factors of production, though only labor 
appears in the denominator. Hence, the increases in output due to  factors such 
as physical capital, average hours worked per man-year, age, sex, and skill 
composition of the work force, and technological change are all included in the 
measure. Index number problems may bias output estimates owing to changes 
in relative prices and product mix. None of these factors is expressly considered 
here. 
A simplifying assumption in the model is that changes in output per 
worker occur independently from employment changes. Hence, a once-and-for- 
all shift in average productivity of labor from period t to  t + j is implied in AA,  
AB,  . . . , AZ, assuming average productivity to  be invariant to subsequent 
changes in the quantity of employment in the sector (or region). This implicitly 
supposes that complementary factor inputs adjust in proportion to  labor inputs 
under conditions of constant returns to  scale for each sector and region. 
One might alternatively assume that labor is subject to  diminishing 
marginal productivity so that AA would be a declining function of Aa and 
similarly for other sectors. There is evidence that investment growth has 
increased more rapidly than the demand for labor since the capital-labor ratio 
is rising in the economy as a whole. However, it is likely that capital deepening 
was disproportional among sectors and regions in Mexico and that the capital- 
labor ratio grew more slowly in the tertiary sector than in the secondary or 
primary sectors. It is also likely that capital deepening was more pronounced in 
the Border region and the Metropolitan Mexico City region than in the Rest of 
Mexico region. Unfortunately, comparable investment figures are unavailable at 
the sectoral or regional level, making it impossible to  estimate the pure marginal 
productivity of labor by region and sector for the three decades studied. Hence, 
the total factor productivity model presented above is used for the analyses in 
Chapters 3-5. 
3 A SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL FACTOR 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE PRIMARY, SECONDARY, 
AND TERTIARY SECTORS FROM 1940 TO 1970 
The pattern of total factor productivity growth among the three principal 
sectors of the economy is presented in Table 6 for four benchmark years, 1940, 
1950, 1960, and 1970. I t  is evident that growth in output per worker was not 
balanced among the sectors nor did the same rank order of growth apply over 
time. In the 1940s the tertiary sector led with absolute productivity growth of 
626 pesos per worker, followed by the primary sector with 550 pesos per 
worker.I2 The fact that 22 percent of overall growth was attributable to  the 
primary sector (Table 7) and 44 percent to  the tertiary sector was extremely 
important in permitting the economy to expand at the rate it did in the 1940s. 
In contrast, the secondary, which might have been expected to take the lead, 
fared least well despite its recovery from several decades of revolution and 
depression during the boom years of World War 11. Productivity grew by only 
148 pesos per worker in the secondary sector, though it accounted for one- 
third of total productivity growth in the economy. T h s  is partially explained 
by the fact that capital deepening in manufacturing only began after World 
War I1 when machinery and equipment imports again became available. The 
lagged effects of these investments are seen in the data for the 1950s (Table 6)  
when the secondary sector took the lead, accounting for almost 40 percent of 
the nation's productivity growth (Table 7). 
The primary sector, which had been given substantial injections of public 
infrastructure investment since the late 1930s, also showed increased produc- 
tivity growth during the 1950s, though it lagged behind the rest of the 
economy. Its share of total productivity growth declined to  one-half of the 
former rate or 11 percent in the 1950s. The relatively large and growing share 
of the labor force in the tertiary sector caused it  to account for an ever- 
increasing share of national productivity growth reachng 50  percent in the 
1950s and 64  percent in the 1960s (Table 7). 
These data point to  the key role of labor migration in Mexico's total 
factor productivity growth. They suggest that a "pull" factor operated 
TABLE 6 Output, employment, and total factor productivity growth in 
Mexico, 1940-70. 
Primary sectoro 
YA Output (value added in 5 171 9 242 
million 1950 pesos) 
NA Labor Force (F'EA~ x l o 3 )  3832 4867 
YA/NA Output per worker 1 349 1 899 
(1950 pesos) 
A(YA/NA) Change in output per worker 550 
over past decade (1950 pesos) 
Secondary sectorC 
YB Output 6788  12466 
NB Labor Force 826 1 490 
YB/NB Output per worker 8218  8366  
A(YB/NB)  Change in output per worker 148 
Tertiary sectord 
Yc Output 10930 19352 
Nc Labor Force 1 200 1 988 
Yc/Nc Output per worker 9108  9734 
A(Yc/Nc)  Change in output per worker 626 
Total GDP 
YT Output 22889 41 060 
NT Labor Force 5 858 8 345 
YT/NT Output per worker 3907 4920  
A ( Y T / N ~ )  Change in output per worker 1013 
Primary sector: agriculture, cattle, foresky, fishing. 
PEA stands for economically active population over 12 years of age. 
Secondary sector: manufacturing, mining, pekoleum, construction, electricity. 
Tertiary sector: transport, communications, commerce, government, other services. (Banking services 
are included in the value added of the respective user sectors including services. Hence their inclusion in 
the tertiary sector is net of an adjustment for banking services in the primary and secondary sectors.) 
Notes on sources and methods: CDP estimates in million 1950 pesos are taken directly from Unikel 
(1976) and Appendini (1974 and private com~~~unication) both of which refer to Solis (1970). There are 
now more recent estimates by the Bank of Mexico for years since 1960, reported in 1960 pesos. These 
later estimates may be compared to those of Solis (1970) by converting the former into 1950 pesos using 
the implicit CDP deflator between 1950 and 1960 of 0.477. This deflator is based on earlier official Bank 
of Mexico CDP series presented in Reynolds (1970, pp. 368-37 3). In that series, CDP for 1960 in current 
prices was 155 867 and in constant 1950 prices 74 317, giving an implicit deflator of 0.477. 
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continually from 1940 into the 1960s, drawing labor from primary into 
secondary and tertiary occupations and sustaining strong absolute and relative 
productivity gains in both sectors. A number of scholars have pointed to the 
potential for increases in output per worker in certain key tertiary activities 
due to capital deepening, technological progress, learning by doing, and the 
rising skill content of labor. Still the enormous upward productivity trend for 
the tertiary sector (Table 7) seems exaggerated. For this reason some alterna- 
tive calculations were made for the present study based on more recent GDP 
estimates by the Bank of Mexico. While these updated data differ from those 
used for the regional estimates in the following chapters (the Unlkel (1976)- 
Appendini (1974) breakdown of GDP at the state level is linked to earlier GDP 
estimates as shown in Table 6), the updated data are useful for checking 
possible biases in aggregate productivity growth estimates due to  previous GDP 
estimates. 
In Table 8, an alternative set of total factor productivity figures (Estimate 
B) is presented for all sectors, using the more recent GDP estimates. These data 
show somewhat more productivity growth in the tertiary sector during the 
1950s and much less in the 1960s than those of Estimate A. The secondary 
sector, on the other hand, shows opposite changes, productivity growth being 
less in the 1950s and greater in the 1960s in Estimate B. Evidence of impressive 
growth in the manufacturing subsector during the 1960s is sustained by the 
new data, as is evidence of acceleration of productivity in the secondary sector. 
Bank of Mexico (1977) Unikel* 
Sector 1960 1970 1960 1970 
(Million pesos) (Million pesos) (Million pesos) 
1960 1950t 1960 1950 1950 
prices prices prices prices prices 
Primary 23 970 11 433 34 535 16 473 13917 17712 
Secondary 43 933 20956 102 154 48 727 24 603 52 198 
Tertiary 82 608 39404 159911 76 278 35 695 82 43 1 
Total GDP 150 5 11 71 793 296 600 141 478 74 215 152 341 
Used in Table 6. 
t Converted by a factor of %peso = 0.477. 
There is probably a wide margin of error in GDP whatever the estimates adopted. For reasons of con- 
sistency with the Unikel-Appendini statewide breakdowns of GDP, which we employ in later sections of 
the paper, the Unikel series was chosen. Hence, growth in output for both the 1950s and 1960s is slightly 
higher in Table 6 than would have been obtained using the more recent revisions of GDP, see Table 6. The 
latter gives a compound annual rate of growth for 1960 to 1970 of 6.8 percent. The later estimates imply 
much less relative productivity growth in the tertiary sector in the 19609, though it still leads in absolute 
terms. 
Labor force estimates are for PEA from the censuses of 1940, 1950, and 1970, as presented in Unikel 
(1976). Data on PEA for 1960 are revised downward based on Altimir (1974), as discussed earlier. 
Data on PEA for 1970 are based on Altimir (1974). The author is indebted to Peter Gregory for calling 
attention to the adjustments required in the 1970 labor force estimates. 
TABLE 7 Sectoral and shift elements underlying growth in output  per 
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Weighted growth of 
output per worker 
Total Mexico 
A Yn 
A n y  
AnAY 
Total A ( Y / N )  growth 
of output per 
worker 
shift (%) 
A Yn estimated change 
in productivity 
with no shft in 
labor force 
Share of productivity 
attributable to the 
shift factor 
Notes: Definitions of sectors are given in Table 6. A A ,  A B ,  and AC refer, respectively, to changes in out- 
put per worker in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors based on data in Table 6. a ,  b ,  and c refer 
to the share of the labor force in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors in the base year of  each 
period. A a ,  a b ,  and AC refer to changes in the sectoral share of the labor force over each decade based 
on  labor force data in Table 6. 
A 1950 peso valued at the exchange rate in that year of 8.64 pesos to the US dollar, was then worth 
about USs0.11.6, which owing to US inflation would be equal to US$0.30 in 1977. Raising the 1950 
But perhaps most notable is that the tertiary sector, which led the rest in 
productivity growth in the 1940s and 19.50s, now lags behind the secondary 
sector. This provides important evidence that service employment may be 
beginning to place a drag on Mexico's overall productivity growth, helping to 
account for a turnaround in the "residual" as reported in Chapter 1. One might 
expect this, given the rush of job seekers to the urban sector, which reflects 
earlier demographic trends, recent lags in agricultural productivity growth, and 
a steady shift toward more capital-intensive cropping since the 1930s. Indeed, 
the primary sector has made a shockingly small contribution to  national 
productivity, falling to  1 1  percent in the 19.50s and to zero in the 1960s 
(Table 7). Even by more recent GDP estimates, which bias upward agricultural 
output growth in the 1960s to 3.7 percent per annum (compared to Unikel's 
figures of 2.4 percent in Table 8), the primary sector only accounted for 1 
percent of national productivity growth in the 19.50s and 4 percent in the 
1960s (Table 9).13 
Based on the data in Table 6,  total factor productivity growth in Mexico 
increased steadily since 1940: from 2.3 percent per annum in the 1940s to  3.9 
percent and 4.8 percent respectively in the 1950s and 1960s. These figures 
agree with the general trend of net productivity growth through the mid-1960s 
presented in Chapter 1 (Table 2), which also takes into account capital and land 
inputs. In absolute terms the increase in output per worker in the 1960s was 
four times that of the 1940s, or  almost 4500 (1950) pesos in the course of the 
decade. This is equivalent to  between 1200 and 2400 current US dollars, 
depending on the conversion factor used. In principle such growth should have 
greatly enlarged the economic "policy space" permitting higher rates of 
savings and investment together with improvements in real incomes of the work 
force. However, more recent GDP estimates show slower growth in the 1960s 
of about 3900 (1950) pesos per worker, or between $1000 and $2000 (1978 
US dollars). (See Table 8 for a comparison of the two sets of estimates.) Of 
course these estimates do  not take into consideration the turning point in the 
mid-1960s indicated by the analysis in Chapter 1. 
Especially interesting is the contribution to overall productivity growth 
made by shifts in employment from lower to  higher productivity occupations. 
This is one important element in the "unexplained residual" presented in Table 
2. To the extent that there has been a shift of the work force toward more 
productive occupations, significant gains in national productivity growth could 
have been experienced without net gains in any specific sector. In Reynolds 
(1970) the shift element was estimated as a residual after deducting from total 
peso to its 1960 peso value, based on the Mexican implicit CDP deflator (110.477) and then converting to 
US dollars at the 1960 purchasing power parity rate of 8 pesos to the dollar would give a 1950 peso value 
of ~ S $ 0 . 2 6  in 1960. At the US GDP deflator between 1960 and 1977 of 2.057, this would represent over 
~ S $ 0 . 5 0  today in terms of purchasing power (Reynolds 1970; US Government Council of Economic 
Advisors 1978). Hence one may estimate the value of 100 (1950) pesos to be between US$30 and US$50 
in 1977. 
TABLE 8 Alternative output and total factor productivity growth, Estimates 
A and B, 1960 and 1970. 
Est. A Est. A %' Est. B %' Est. A %' Est. B %' 
Primary sector 
YA Output 9242 13917 4.1 11433 2.1 17712 2.4 16473 3.7 
(value added in 
million 1950 
pesos) 
NA Labor 4867 5 048 5 408 
force (PEA 
x lo3) 
YA/NA Output 1 899 2 757 2 265 
per worker 
(1 950 pesos) 
A ( Y ~ / N ~ ) ~  Change 858 366 





YB 12466 24603 6.8 20959 5.2 52198 7.5 48727 8.4 
NB 1490 2175 2 175 3 439 3 439 
YB /NB 8366 11312 9 636 15 178 14 169 
A ( Y ~ / N ~ ) ~  2 946 1 270 3 866 4 533 
Tertiary sector 
yc 19352 35695 6.1 39404 7.1 82431 8.4 76278 6.6 
N c  1988 2990 2 990 4 223 4 223 
yc /Nc 9734 11938 13 179 19 517 18063 
A (YCINC)~ 2 204 3 445 7 579 4 884 
Total GDP 
YT 41 060 74215 5.9 71 794 5.6 152341 7.2 141478 6.8 
NT 8345 10213 10213 12 955 12 955 
y ~ / N ~  4920 7267 7 030 11 759 10 921 
A ( YTINT? 2 347 2 110 4 495 3 891 
" Rate of growth per annum. 
Total factoral productivity. 
Notes: Definitions of sectors are given in Table 6. Estimate A corresponds t o  Tables 6 and 7; the GDP 
f w r e s  for 1960 and 1970 are taken from Unikel (1976) using as sources Appendini (1974) and Bank of 
Mexico (1977), and the labor force data for 1970 are from Unikel (1976). For 1960 the Unikel faures 
are adjusted based on Altimir (1974). Estimate B uses more recent GDP estimates for 1960 and 1970 
from the Bank of Mexico expressed in constant 1960 pesos and converted for this study using the implicit 
GDP deflator of 0.477 (1960) pesos = 1 (1950) peso as in Reynolds (1978). The Altimir and Unikel labor 
force figures for 1960 and 1970 are used in both Estimates A and B (see footnotes to Table 6 for details) 
whereas in Reynolds (197 8) the adjusted 1960 and 1970 census figures were uscd. 
TABLE 9 Alternative sectoral and shift elements in productivity growth, 
Estimate B, 1950-70. (All nonpercentage figures represent 1950 pesos per 
worker.) 
Sector and total Mexico 1950-60 % 1960-70 % 
Primary sector 
AAa (Sectoral) 
A d  (Shift) 
A aA A (Combined) 















Total A (Y /N)  growth of output per worker 
Shift component 
Note: Definitions o f  sectors are given in Table 6. 
productivity growth in each sector the component that could be attributed 
to own sectoral increases in output per worker (aAA, bAB, . . . , zAZ). The 
remainder represents the sum of the pure duft ( A d ,  AbB, . . . , AzZ) and 
combined components (AaAA, AbAB, . . . , AzAZ). It was found that the 
shift factor fell from 41 percent of national productivity growth in the 1940s 
to 24 percent in the 1950s (Reynolds, 1970: 66-68), indicating that although 
the movement of labor between sectors was extremely important in the first 
decade of rapid growth, it was much less so in the 1950s. It is now possible to 
carry this analysis forward due to more recent estimates of output and em- 
ployment through 1970. The shift component, based on Estimate A (Table 
7), appears to have been even more important than was earlier believed. It is 
now seen to have accounted for 50 percent of productivity growth in the 
1940s, falling to 34 percent in the 1950s and 26 percent in the 1960s. Estimate 
B (Table 9) also shows the trend declining in the 1950s when the shift com- 
ponent was 40  percent of productivity growth, after which it fell to 28 percent 
in the 1960s. However, the contribution of the secondary sector to the shift 
factors (shift and combined) relative t o  the tertiary sector increased signifi- 
cantly in the 1960s, its share of the shift factor rising from 38 percent in the 
1950s to 69 percent in the 1960s (Table 9). 
The implications of these results are that as much as half of  the total 
factor productivity growth in the 1940s was associated with labor force shifts 
from lower to higher productivity occupations. However over the next two 
decades, the shift factor fell to  one-fourth of total productivity growth. Hence, 
there is strong evidence that the shift contribution t o  Mexican productivity 
growth is declining. Also the relative importance of the tertiary sector for 
transmission of productivity growth through labor absorption is diminishing, 
notwithstanding sustained increases in income per worker within that sector. 
For future productivity growth to  continue, greater stress must be placed on 
investments that are complementary to  labor and on labor-absorbing techno- 
logical progress in the primary and secondary sectors as well as in the tertiary 
sector since the s h f t  factor cannot be expected to  take up the slack as before. 
Data at the national level indicate that the gains from labor diffusion and 
internal migration are dwindling and that more attention must be directed to 
investment and innovations in those localities and occupations where labor 
is most redundant. 
4 A SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS O F  TOTAL FACTOR 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE SIX MAIN AREAS O F  
MEXICO FROM 1940 TO 1970 
In order to determine the impact on productivity of internal migration of the 
labor force, shift-share analysis has been applied t o  output and employment 
data for the six major areas of Mexico.14 The results are presented in Tables 
10 and 1 1. They indicate that the regional shift factor does not appear to be 
of major importance in explaining productivity growth, especially when 
compared with sectoral elements as analyzed in Chapter 2. For example, the 
regional shift component in the 1940s was no higher than 16 percent, falling 
t o  11 percent in the 1950s, and recovering to 14 percent in the 1960s (Table 
11). This implies that at  the most only one-seventh to one-tenth of the growth 
in output per worker could have been explained by movement of the work 
force from lower to higher productivity areas, with that share falling over the 
course of the three decades. 
These figures also permit one to examine the effect of regional relocation 
of the work force on regional inequality in output per worker. The rank 
ordering of total factor productivity for the six areas remains almost unchanged 
over the four benchmark years, with the Metropolitan Mexico City area well 
ahead in each year followed by the North Pacific (Table 10). The North area, 
also including primarily border states with the USA, is third in all years except 
1950, when it was temporarily displaced by the Gulf area (which includes the 
city of Veracruz and a major traditional oil producing region). In all other years 
the Gulf ranked fourth. The rest of the Center (which excludes Mexico City 
and the state of Mexico) ranked next to  last in all years, followed finally by the 
Pacific South. 
There is some evidence that the gap between richest and poorest regions is 
gradually narrowing since output per worker in the Metropolitan Mexico City 
area was 6.8 times that of the Pacific South in 1940. This multiple declined to 
4.6 in 1950, rose again to 5.9 in 1960, and ultimately fell back to 5.0 in 1970. 
In the 1940s Metropolitan Mexico City accounted for only 24 percent of 
national productivity growth, but its share doubled to 56 percent in the 1950s 
TABLE 10 Output, employment, and total factor productivity by area, 
1940-70. 
Region 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Northa 
YN Output (value added in 
million 1950 pesos) 
NN Labor force (PEA x l o3 )  
N = YN/NN Output per worker 
(1950 pesos) 
A (YN/NN) Change in output per 
worker over past decade 
( 1  950 pesos) 
n = NN/NT Labor force share 
GUZP 
YG Output 
NG Labor force 
G = YG/NG Output per worker 
A (YG/NG) Change in output 
g = NG/NT Labor force share 
North PacifcC 
Yp Output 
Np Labor force 
P = Yp/Np Output per worker 
A(Yp/Np) Change in output 
p = NP/NT Labor force share 
South pacificd 
Ys Output 
Ns Labor force 
S = Ys/Ns Output per worker 
A(Ys/Ns) Change in output 
s = Ns/NT Labor force share 
Metropolitan Mexico city 
YD Output 
ND Labor force 
D = YD/ND Output per worker 
A(YD/ND) Change in output 
d = YD/NT Labor force share 
Rest of Centerf 
Yc Output 
Nc Labor force 
C = Yc/Nc Output per worker 
A(Yc/Nc) Change in output 
c = Nc/NT Labor force share 
TABLE 10 Continued 
Region 1940 1950 1960 1970 
- - 
To to1 Mexico 
YT Output 22 889 41 060 74215 152341 
NT Labor force 5 858 8 345 10 213 12 955 
T = YT/NT Output per worker 3 907 4 920 7 267 11 759 
A(YT/NT) Change in output 1013 2 346 4491 
t = NT/NT Labor force share 1 .OO 1 .OO 1 .OO 1 .OO 
a North: Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas. 
* Gulf: Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatdn. 
North Pacific: Baja California N . ,  Baja California S.,  Nayarit, Sinaloa, Sonora. 
South Pacific: Colima, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca. 
MetropoIitan Mexico Clty: Federal District (Mexico D.C.), State of Mexico. 
Rest o f  Center: Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, MichoacBn. Morelos, Puebla, Querdtaro, 
Tlaxcala. 
SOURCES: GDP and labor force by region are aggregated fmm state level data est~mated by Unikel 
(1976) and Appendini (1974). 
and remained high at 46 percent in the 1960s (Table 11). It appears that labor 
absorption by Metropolitan Mexico City in the 1940s was accompanied by 
relatively slow productivity growth. One may presume that had agricultural 
policy been delayed during that crucial decade, causing urbanization to have 
been even greater than it was, the resulting drag on productivity growth would 
have seriously undermined political and economic stability and have increased 
pressure for migration to  the USA. The timing of public investment policy, in 
agriculture first, then in manufacturing, was of the utmost importance in 
preventing premature urbanization. 
Hence, there was a reduction in the gap of regional income inequality 
between 1940 and 1950, a widening during the 1950s, and a narrowing again 
in the 1960s. Despite the small regional shift factor, some of this reduction 
in inequality may well be due to internal migration as suggested by Unikel 
(1976: 182). He refers to Mexico's possible confirmation of the Williamson 
model (Williamson 1965) in which urbanization may widen income gaps in the 
short run but will narrow them in the long run. Unikel notes that migration was 
from lower productivity regions to those with higher incomes per capita, and 
still the productivity growth in the leading areas continued to outstrip the 
in-migration of labor. This finding is supported by shift-share analysis for the 
six areas since those areas with a negative shift factor (due to declining labor 
force shares) tended t o  be the poorest, namely the South Pacific and Rest of 
Center. The behavior of the North and Gulf areas is ambiguous since both had 
negative shift factors in two of the three periods, the Gulf in the 1940s and 
1950s and the North in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The following are the means and standard deviations of output per worker 
in the six areas for the four benchmark years. The ratio of the mean to the stan- 
dard deviation indicates the inverse of the degree of dispersion of productivity. 
TABLE 1 1  Sectoral and shift elements underlying growth in output per 
worker by area, 1940-70. (All nonpercentage figures represent 1950 pesos per 
worker.) 
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Combined - 8 
Total 1010 
TABLE 1 1 Continued 
Region 1940-50 % 1950-60 % 1960-70 % 
Estimated change in 847 
productivity with 
no  shift in labor 
force 
Share of productivity 1010 - 847 2347 - 209 1 4486 - 3845 
attributed to shift 1010 = 0.16 = 0.1 1 = 0.14 2347 4486 
factor 
Note: Definitions o f  areas are given in Table 10. 
SOURCE: Figures in this table are calculated from data in Table 10. 
1940 1950 1960 - 1970 
p Mean productivity of the six 4 200 5 265 7 390 11 370 
areas (1950 pesos per worker) 
a Standard deviation of 1 193 860 1921  2 7 7 1  
productivity of the six areas 
(1950 pesos per worker) 
p Ratio of mean t o  standard 
- 
3.5 6.1 3.8 4.1 
a deviation; indication of 
narrowing of productivity 
differentials among regions 
These ratios evidence a sharp reduction in regional inequality between 1940 
and 1950, after which the earlier pattern was recovered. Between 1960 and 
1970 there is evidence that regional disparities narrowed again, providing 
modest support for the Williamson hypothesis. In order to  test the results still 
further, GDP is broken into rural and urban income shares in Table 12. The 
results are then compared with rural and urban population shares to  estimate 
trends in relative income shares associated with rapid urbanization since 1940 
(Table 13). 
One would expect from the importance of the shift effect in gradually 
leveling area incomes that there might have been a narrowing of the gap of 
productivity (and income) between the rural and urban sectors of Mexico over 
the same period. This would hold if the pull factors were dominant in urban 
migration, such that labor drawn out of the rural sector by higher income 
possibilities in the cities would cause the rural marginal productivity of labor t o  
rise together with capital- and land-labor ratios. This then would have been 
reflected in the relative growth of rural income shares. However, there is an 
additional element, namely, the demand for rural output. If rural physical 
productivity rose but demand for farm output lagged, the rural terms of trade 
TABLE 12 Ruralturban income shares, 1960-75 (%). 
1960 1965 1970 1975 
Shares of gross domestic product 2 8 27 22 20 
imputed to rural areas 
1. Agriculture 
Share of total GDP 
Rural GDP share 
2. Extractive industries 
Share of total GDP 4.9 4.9 5.2 5.5 
Rural GDP share 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 
3. Commerce and transportation 
Share of total GDP 34.5 34.8 35.0 35.1 
Rural GDP share 6.2 5.6 4.7 4.2 
4. Manufacturing, construction, 
and electricity 
Share of total GDP 24.3 26.4 29.2 30.3 
Rural GDP shares 0 0 0 0 
5. Government 
Share of total GDP 
Rural GDP share 
6. Other sectors 
Share of total GDP 
Rural GDP share 
Sources and methods: Distribution of shares is as in Reynolds (1970, Table 2.7). where 
1. Agriculture: 90 percent rural. 
2. Extractive Industries: 35 percent rural based on 1950 input-output table for Mexico 
3. Commerce and transport = (3) X 112 rural share of GDP in other sectors. 
10% GDP (3) 
4. Manufacturing, construction, electricity: all urban. 
5. Government: all urban. 
6. Rent and other: proportional to population share in rural sector 1960: 0.493; 1965 (est.): 0.452; 
1970: 0.414; 1975 (est.): 0.400. 
Derived shares are from GDP estimates of Bank of Mexico (1977) (1960 pesos) corresponding to those in 
Estimate B. For thisreason the 1960 sharesfor agriculture and rural GDP are well below those in Reynolds 
(1970, p. 72). which were 18.9 (c.f. 15.9) and 32 (c.f. 28), respectively. 
(prices of farm products relative to goods and services) might decline, thus off- 
setting t h ~ s  favorable trend of growth of rural income shares. In the estimates 
in Table 12 constant value indexes of rural and urban GDP have been used so as 
to  minimize the terms of trade effects. 
With t h s  adjustment the real output of the rural sector per rural dweller 
fell relative to that of the urban areas in all periods except for the 1940s and 
the interval from 1960 to 1965 (Table 13). Indeed, the situation as of 1975 
TABLE 13 The distribution of GDP and population rural and urban, 1940-75 
(%). 
Share 1940 1950 1960 1965 1970 1975 
1 .  Rural share of GDP 40 36 28 27 22 20 
2. Urban share of GDP 60 64 72 73 78 80 
3. Rural share of population 65 5 7 49 45 4 1 40 
4.  Urban share of population 35 43 5 1 5 5 59 60 
5. Rural share of GDP/Rural 0.62 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.50 
share of population 
(Row 1 /Row 3 = Row 5) 
SOURCE: Table 12 for 1960-75 and Reynolds (1970, p. 74) for 1940-50. Owing to thelatest GDP 
estimates used for 1960-75, the 1960 ratio of rural GDP to population falls from 0.65 (Reynolds 1970) 
to 0.57. 
indicates that relative rural per capita output was only half that of the urban 
sector, compared to  over 6 0  percent in 1940. 
Clearly, the process of migration of the work force has failed to narrow 
the relative rural-urban income gap. Of course, since real income in both rural 
and urban areas has multiplied several times, the absolute gap has widened even 
more. T o  the extent that migration decisions are made on the basis of  expected 
income, the absolute rather than relative gap may be more relevant to  a study 
of  the relationship between productivity growth and migration. Output per 
capita rose from 3600 (1960) pesos in 1960 to almost 5000 (1960) pesos in 
1970, a gain of between 575 and 800 current US dollars, depending on the 
conversion factor used. However, the gap between Mexico's rural per capita 
output and real wages in US agriculture paid to temporarily migrating Mexican 
workers remains double or  triple that amount. 
In order to  determine the relative importance of migration to  the regional 
pattern of employment, a hypothetical regional labor supply estimation was 
made for which it was assumed that there had been no migration. In the 
absence of migration it was assumed that the economically active population 
over 12 years of age (PEA) in each region would have grown in direct pro- 
portion to its initial labor force at the beginning of each of the three decades 
from 1940 t o  1970. The difference between thjs hypothetical growth of labor 
supply and observed increases in active population in each region gives a crude 
indicator of net regional migration of labor. Of course, this indicator is sensitive 
t o  errors in the underlying assumptions of proportional changes in demographic 
factors among regions and proportional shifts in labor participation rates. How- 
ever, the results are suggestive of general trends in labor force migration and 
hence are used to estimate the relative importance of such shifts in regional 
patterns of productivity growth. 
I t  can be seen from Table 14 that total internal migration estimated in 
these terms has amounted to a steadily increasing share of labor force growth. 
[;f TABLE 14 Estimates of labor force growth assuming no  net migration among the six areas, 1940-70 [labor force 
(X l o 3 ) ] .  
1940 1950 1960 1970 
Observed Observed Estimated Observed Estimated Observed Estimated 
labor labor labor Estimated labor labor Estimated labor labor Estimated 
Region forcea forcea force migration forcea force migration forcea forceb migration 
1. North 1121 1631 1594 + 37 1 954 1990 - 36 2 350 2477 -127 
2. Gulf 711 973 1010 - 37 1 174 1194 - 2 0  1 496 1491 + 5 
3. North Pacific 362 549 5 17 + 32 748 673 + 75 1034 947 + 87 
4. South Pacific 769 1 088 1093 - 5 1295 1327 - 32 1375 1647 - 272 
5. Metropolitan 946 1545 1352 + 193 2 111 1888 + 223 3 223 2685 + 538 
Mexico City 
6. Rest of Center 1948 2 558 2779 -221 2 922 3133 -211 3478 3709 -231 
Total labor force 5858 8344 8344 10204 10204 12956 12956 
Mexico 
Net migration + 263 -f 299 * 630 
Net migration/growth 11 16 23 
in labor force (%) 
Note: Definitions of areas are given in Table 10. 
a Observed labor force is from Table 10. 
Estimated labor force for region A in year r + j = N /N X NT ,. 
At Tr r+, 
That share, which was only 11 percent in the 1940s, increased to  16 and 23 
percent respectively in the 1950s and 1960s. Without going into the underlying 
causes of this labor movement, it is evident that regional patterns of produc- 
tivity growth have been closely associated with increased internal migration. 
The most notable relationship is the strong apparent link between labor force 
migration and regional productivity growth. Two of the three leading areas in 
overall productivity growth, Metropolitan Mexico City and the North Pacific, 
also showed net labor in-migration in each of the three decades (Table 11). 
However the North, which was second in productivity growth in both the 
1950s and 1960s, had a net outflow of labor in both periods. This is almost 
certainly associated with impoverished agriculture in the arid regions through- 
out the North, which caused rural out-migration to  outstrip urban growth in 
Monterrey and the border cities. On the other hand, in the 1940s the North 
was a net attracting area for emigration. Third place shifted to  the Gulf, which 
after losing labor at decreasing rates in the 1940s and 1950s, became an area of 
net in-migration by the 1960s. With the recent petroleum boom, this pattern 
continues. 
In no case did permanent internal labor migration represent an important 
share of the total work force, the percentage actually falling between the 1940s 
and 1950s from 3.2 percent to 2.9 percent. However, the share of migration in 
labor force growth has steadily increased to almost one-fourth of net growth in 
the 1960s. By that decade the absolute share of migration (1960- 1970) had 
risen to 5 percent of the 1970 labor force. The amount of temporary migration 
is of course missing from these figures since they are based on decennial census 
data. However, there is strong evidence that seasonal migration is very 
important, especially, in the rural labor market. Thousands of workers move 
back and forth, many of them hundreds of miles, during the halvest seasons, 
and many of them also travel across the border on a seasonal basis as temporary 
migrant workers in the USA. 
5 A SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS OF  PRODUCI'IVRY GROWTH IN 
THE THREE MAIN REGIONS - METROPOLRAN MEXICO CITY, 
BORDER, AND REST O F  MEXICO - FROM 1940 TO 1970 
In view of the large and growing importance of migratory relations between 
Mexico and the United States, it was decided that the shift-share effects of 
regional output and employment changes for Mexico's two major regions of 
in-migration, the Border states plus Metropolitan Mexico City, vis $ vis the 
rest of the country, should be estimated. The breakdown is justified by the 
findings in Chapter 4 which indicated that the North and Pacific North have 
disproportionately large increases in output per worker and that the Pacific 
North together with Metropolitan Mexico City consistently experiences net 
in-migration. One may expect that the greater the imbalance in regional 
output growth, the more migration (shift factor) will serve to  diffuse 
productivity gains through the work force. On the other hand, the more 
proportional the growth among regions, the more regional productivity 
factors will dominate. Where the "pull factor" is relatively strong, initial 
differentials in regional output growth will be maintained despite rapid 
shifts of the labor force from lower to  higher growth regions. Where the 
"push factor" dominates, labor force migration could dampen potential 
regional inequalities in productivity growth by forcing down the marginal 
productivity of labor in the receiving regions while allowing it to rise in the 
sending regions. 
The gravity model of labor force movement, together with trade in 
goods and services and capital flows, suggests that the shift factor will work 
to  equalize factor incomes. Given the fact that the United States enjoys 
much lugher output per worker than Mexico and is relatively accessible to 
Mexican labor, the gravity model would imply that the Mexican work force 
should gradually displace itself northward and shift into the sphere of 
influence of the US labor market. Indeed, there is strong evidence from the 
data on the Border region that labor force growth in areas adjacent to  the 
Border has been much greater than elsewhere. Some of this movement has 
been within the Border states, from rural areas to  urban centers located on the 
3 0 
frontier, which are connected to  US service economy through tourism and 
which have recently established a number of Border industry assembly plants 
(maquiladoras). These plants are linked with US manufacturers, and 'duty is 
charged only on the value-added components for reexport. Since the North 
also serves as a staging area for migration into the USA, it (especially the North 
Pacific) has had a net attraction effect on migration from the center and south 
of Mexico only exceeded by that of Metropolitan Mexico City. 
This chapter presents a cursory view of the implications of North/South 
regionalization in terms of shift-share analysis. Table 15 reorganizes earlier data 
TABLE 1 5 Output, employment, and total factor productivity by region, 
1940-70. 
Region 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Bordef 
YB Output (in million 1950 
pesos) 
NB Labor force (PEA x lo3) 
B = YB/NB Output per worker (1950 
pesos) 
AB Change in output per 
worker over past decade 
(1 950 pesos) 
t = NB/NT Labor force share 
Metropolitan Mexico aty 
TM Output 
NM Labor force 
M = YM/NM Output per worker 
AM Change in output per worker 
m = NM/NT Labor force share 
Rest o f  Mexico 
YR Output 
NR Iabor force 
R = YR/NR Output per worker 
AR Change in output per worker 
r = NR/NT Labor force share 
Total Mexico 
YT Output 
NT Labor force 
T = YJN,  Output per worker 
AT Change in output per worker 
t = NT/NT Labor force share 
a Border: Baja Cahfornia N., Baja California S., Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Tarnaulipas. 
Metropolitan Mexico City: Federal District (Mexico D.C.) and State of Mexico. 
Rest of Mexico: All other states. 
SOURCE: Figures are calculated from data in Table 10. 
so as to  permit an examination of the three major regions: Border, Metropolitan 
Mexico City, and Rest of Mexico. One can quickly see the immense and growing 
gap between output per worker in the Border region and that of the Rest of 
Mexico. The difference in labor productivity rose from 3741 (1950) pesos in 
1940 to 11 196 pesos in 1970, notwithstanding the fact that the productivity 
growth rate in the Rest of Mexico was 3.4 percent per annum over the 30 
year period, almost equal t o  that of the Border, which was 3.5. This is due t o  
the simple mathematics of growth, whereby even though values subject to wide 
absolute differentials grow at almost the same rates, their absolute gap may 
widen substantially over time. The gravity process may be working in Mexico, 
however, since Metropolitan Mexico City has grown at a slower rate than the 
Rest of Mexico in productivity terms (2.8 percent per annum) between 1940 
and 1970. However, here again a disturbing element is that the absolute 
productivity gap, which was wide between the Border and Rest of Mexico 
(1 1 196 pesos in 1970), was even greater between Metropolitan Mexico City and 
the Rest of Mexico, rising from 6433 (1 950) pesos in 1940 to 13 836 (1 950) 
pesos in 1970. Since the purchasing power parity of a 1950 peso is today 
(1 978) about US$O.SO, the comparable value of this differential in productivity 
between the Border and the Rest of Mexico in 1970 is about $5600 in 1978 US 
dollars and between Metropolitan Mexico City and the Rest of Mexico about 
US$7000. 
Most noteworthy about the evidence from Table 15 is that the gravity 
process appears to be narrowing the absolute productivity gap between the 
Border and Metropolitan Mexico City from 2672 (1950) pesos in 1940 to 
2640 (1950) pesos in 1970. This has resulted from a much faster migration 
of labor over the 30-year period t o  the Metropolitan Mexico City region (4.1 
percent per annum), while output growth was about the same in both regions 
(6.9 percent per annum). The spillover of labor from the Border region into 
the US labor market is not measured. There is no place for migrants to  
Metropolitan Mexico City to  go but back home or  northward. Hence it is likely 
that the gravity effect is more successful in leveling income between 
Metropolitan Mexico City and the Rest of Mexico than between the Border 
and the Rest of Mexico. This will continue as long as income differentials 
between the Border and the USA remain so much greater in absolute terms. 
Since output and productivity in the US economy are growing much more 
slowly than in Mexico, and especially in Mexico's two major regions of 
attraction, it would not be surprising if the gravity process eventually began to 
show a leveling effect between the two countries. However, as we have seen, 
where absolute income differentials remain so large it will take decades before 
growth rate differentials will narrow absolute income gaps. Until this happens, 
wide gaps in earnings will drive the forces of migration. Indeed, the findings 
presented in this chapter indicate that the lure of Metropolitan Mexico City 
may well begin to  give place to  that of major Border areas and the USA as 
TABLE 16 Sectoral and shlft elements underlying growth in output per 
worker by region, 1940-70. (All nonpercentage figures represent 1950 pesos 
per worker.) 
Region 1940-50 % 1950-60 % 196CL70 % 
Border 



















Share of productivity growth 
attributed to shift factor 
between regions 
Note: Definitions of regions are given in Table 15. 
SOURCE: Figures are calculated from data in Table 10. 
Metropolitan Mexico City's productivity gap begins to decline vis A vis that of 
the Border. Hopefully, if new centers of growth are fostered within Mexico, 
this could considerably alter the path of migration. 
How much has migration mattered in terms of overall productivity 
growth? In Table 16 the own regional productivity growth and interregional 
shift factors are measured for the three decades. Here again, as in the analysis 
of the six areas of Mexico in Chapter 4,  there is evidence that the interregional 
shift factor declined as a share of total productivity growth from 19 percent in 
the 1940s to 13 percent in the 1950s and remained at  14 percent in the 1960s. 
In short, the role of regional labor movement was important in raising overall 
productivity in the 1940s but has played a smaller role since then. In regional 
terms the contribution of Metropolitan Mexico City to the overall shift factor 
has risen substantially from 70 percent of the positive shift component in the 
1940s to 93 percent in the 1960s (the remainder being attributed to the 
Border). Hence while the Border region continues to exhibit "pull" tendencies, 
the Metropolitan Mexico City region may well begin to be dominated by 
"push" forces as labor moves there in a desperate search for release from rural 
poverty and underemployment in other regions. In terms of its contribution to  
total productivity growth in Mexico, Metropolitan Mexico City has risen from 
one-fourth in the 1940s to over one-half in the 1950s, though this share 
declined somewhat to 46 percent in the 1960s, while the Border recovered its 
earlier 28 percent share. Interestingly, the Rest of Mexico with 70  percent of 
the work force in 1940 contributed one-half of total productivity growth in 
that decade, while its contribution declined to only 20 percent in the 1950s as 
Metropolitan Mexico City mushroomed in terms of both population and out- 
put. However, by the 1960s the Rest of Mexico's productivity share began to 
rise again, increasing to 26 percent, while its labor share fell to 58 percent. This 
augurs favorably for the continuation of the diffusion of Mexican productivity 
growth from the center to the periphery. The process is consistent with the 
gravity model of migration since output per worker in the Rest of Mexico grew 
by 3.4 percent per annum since 1940 compared with only 2.8 percent in 
Metropolitan Mexico City. Indeed the Rest of Mexico did almost as well as the 
Border region (3.5 percent per annum). Notwithstanding this performance, 
pockets of poverty and stagnation remain throughout the countryside and 
particularly in the northern desert regions, the central plateau, and the eroded 
areas of the south. Most of the rural areas are subject to erratic rainfall, and 
many small- and medium-sized urban centers have long since lost their com- 
parative advantage for growth and will remain so in the absence of major new 
state development efforts, which include incentives for investment and technical 
progress suited to  the special conditions of the regions. 
While the analysis throughout this monograph has related migration to 
output and productivity rather than to  income, it is recognized that among 
economic incentives labor movement is primarily responsive to expected 
wages and that wages are not necessarily related to  total factor productivity, 
especially in a country in which the supply of labor from impoverished areas 
is so abundant. Indeed, it is possible for output per worker to rise consider- 
ably while real wages remain low or even decline (especially during periods of 
inflationary growth). However, total factor productivity gives some idea of 
the output per employed worker capable of supporting improvements in 
infrastructure, eduction, and other investments, which will eventually permit 
income to be diffused more broadly. This may occur through private 
expenditures by the recipients of profit and rental income as well as through 
increased capacity of the government to tax and spend on activities favoring 
social and economic progress. Moreover, the availability of urban amenities and 
other nonwage benefits, which attract labor to new locations, tends to be 
highly correlated with total factor productivity, even though real wages of 
unskilled labor may lag. Furthermore, the ability of workers to organize and 
TABLE 17 Estimates of labor force migration, 1940-70 [labor force (x 1 O3 )I  
- - 
1940 1950 1960 1970 
Observed Observed Estimated Estimated Observed Estimated Estimated Observed Estimated Estimated 
labor labor labor migration labor labor migration labor labor migration 
Region forcea forcea force (1 940-50) forcea force (1 950-60) forcea forceb (1 960-70) 
Border 778 1225 1110 + I 1 5  1630 1501 + 129 2120 2070 + 50 
Metropolitan 946 1545 1344 + 201 2111 1889 + 222 3223 2680 + 543 
Mexico City 
Rest of Mexico 4 134 5575 5891 - 316 6471 6822 - 351 7612 8205 - 593 
Total Mexico 5 858 8 345 10212 12955 
Net migration 13 19 22 
growth in 
labor force (%) 
a Observed labor force from Table 15. 
Estimated labor force - see Table 14 and text referring to Table 14. Estimates do not agree due to rounding. 
Note: Definitions of regions are given in Table 15. 
bargain collectively is directly related to the surplus (rental income including 
excess profits) earned per worker that is available to be bargained between 
labor and capital. Hence labor incomes may be increased in those subsectors of 
the labor market where such "economic rents" (broadly defined) are generated, 
and the increase in labor income tends also to be directly related to sectoral 
productivity growth (more appropriately, to "net" sectoral productivity 
growth after subtracting a normal return to capital). 
Finally, in Table 17, estimated net labor force migration among the three 
regions is shown for the three decades. Here again, as in Chapter 4, migration is 
shown to have steadily increased as a share of labor force growth even after the 
net flows are restricted to the three main regions. Indeed, the shares remain 
about the same as those among the six areas (Table 14) since most net regional 
migration has been toward the Border and Metropolitan Mexico City. (The 
North Pacific is the only other main region of net in-migration and then only 
since the 1950s.) Most net labor migration in the 1960s was to Metropolitan 
Mexico City (92 percent), though in earlier decades the Border accounted for 
about 36  percent. Again, this may be due to increasing evidence of under- 
employment in the border towns, notwithstanding their rapid growth in 
output, as well as to the desperate poverty of agriculture in most border 
regions and finally to the "passing on" of regional migration to  the USA. 
The rank correlation is weak between growth in productivity and 
growth in migration among the three regions since the Border and Rest of 
Mexico show much faster productivity growth than Metropolitan Mexico Citv 
over the three decades, though the latter experienced the major share of in- 
migration. However, when one looks at absolute productivity differentials, 
the correlation becomes more perfect since Metropolitan Mexico City has led 
throughout the period in both absolute income per capita and in-migration, 
followed by the Border, which is catching up in income per capita. The Rest 
of Mexico, which still lags behind the other two regions by over 10 000 (1950) 
pesos per worker, continues t o  register an important rate of out-migration 
amounting to almost 600000 workers between 1960 and 1970, or one-third 
of the increase in its labor force. 
6 A SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS O F  THE PRIMARY, SECONDARY, 
AND TERTIARY SECTORS O F  THE THREE MAIN REGIONS O F  
MEXICO FROM 1940 TO 1970 
In this chapter the same regionalization is used (Border, Metropolitan Mexico 
City, and Rest of Mexico) to determine those intraregional shifts that caused 
the respective growth patterns of the main sending and receiving regions. For 
this purpose, the change in output and employment o f  the main production 
sectors - primary, secondary, and tertiary - is analyzed for each region. Tables 
18 to 20 present the underlying data on output,  employment, and total factor 
productivity, and Tables 2 1 to 23 provide estimates of the sectoral and shift 
components of productivity growth for each of the three regions. The results 
are as follows. 
In the Border region there is important evidence that the internal shift 
factor as a share of the region's productivity growth fell from almost one-half 
(48 percent) in the 1940s to one-third (33 percent) in the 1950s and to less 
than one-tenth (9 percent) in the 1960s (Table 2 1). Hence, the Border region 
has been increasingly unable to generate overall productivity growth simply by 
moving its work force from an impoverished agriculture to more productive 
employment in manufacturing and services. Migration among sectors has 
continued (Table 18) but the sectoral productivity component has grown 
from one-half to 9 0  percent of growth in output per worker. In the 1960s 
the Border states' manufacturing sector (secondary) accounted for most of 
the relative increase, its share rising from 28 to  37 percent of productivity 
growth, which is a very healthy sign (Table 2 1). This contrasts sharply with the 
Metropolitan Mexico City region where the share of productivity growth from 
the secondary sector fell from 57 percent in the 1950s to 27 percent in the 
1960s (Table 22). The establishment of border industries linked to the US 
economy plus growth of industry in Monterrey almost certainly had much to  
d o  with this impressive performance of the Border region. Industry in 
Metropolitan Mexico City, on the other hand, grew on the basis of production 
through tariffs and quotas. Oriented toward import substitution, industry in 
Metropolitan Mexico City showed much less productivity growth in the 1960s 
TABLE 18 Output, employment, and total factor productivity growth in the 
Border region, 1940-70. 
1940 1950 1960 1970 
Rimary sector 
YA Output (value added in 1052 2102 3 437 5 916 
million 1950 pesos) 
NA Labor fo rce (PEAx10~)  448 6 14 629 642 
YA/NA = A  Output per worker 2 348 3 423 5464 9215 
(1950 pesos) 
A(TA/NA) Change in output per worker 1075 2 04 1 3751 
over past decade 
(1950 pesos) 
NA/NT = a Labor share in sector 0.574 0.501 0.386 0.303 
Secondary sector 
YE Output 1501 2 935 5208 12521 
NB Labor force 143 265 409 594 
YB/NB = B Output per worker 10497 11075 12733 21079 
A(YB/NB) Change in output per worker 578 1658 8 346 
NB/NT = b Labor share 0.183 0.216 0.251 0.280 
Tertiary sector 
Yc Output 2 204 4089 8195 19045 
Nc Labor force 189 346 592 884 
Yc/Nc = C Output per worker 11661 11818 13843 21544 
A(Yc/Nc) Change in output per worker 157 2025 7701 
Nc/NT = c Labor share 0.242 0.282 0.363 0.417 
Total region 
YT Output 4 757 9126 16840 37482 
N T  Labor force 780 1225 1630 2119 
YT/NT Output per worker 6098 7450 10331 17689 
A(YT/NT) Change in output per worker 1352 2 881 7 358 
Note: Definitions of sectors are given in Table 6. Definition of the Border region isgiven in Table 15. 
than did industry in the Border region (Tables 18 and 19). Earlier, in the 
1950s, Metropolitan Mexico City's import substituting manufacturing had 
taken a temporary lead in productivity growth after having shown a net decline 
in the 1940s (Tables 18 and 19).15 
The Border region's primary sector labor share steadily declined, most 
importantly in the 1950s, so that its rural employment share in 1970 was only 
30  percent compared to 57 percent for the Rest of Mexico (Tables 18 and 20). 
Hence it is not surprising that the primary sector contribution to productivity 
growth in the Border region fell from 27 percent in the 1940s to 9 percent in 
the 1960s. However, output per worker in the primary sector of the Border region 
grew by twice that of the Rest of Mexico in the 1940s, three times more in the 
TABLE 19 Output, employment, and total productivity growth in the 
Metropolitan Mexico City region, 1940-70. 
1940 1950 1960 1970 
Primary sector 
YA Output (value added in 
million 1950 pesos) 
NA Labor force (PEA x lo3) 
YA/NA = A Output per worker 
(1950 pesos) 
A(TA/NA) Change in output per worker 
over past decade 
(1950 pesos) 
NA/NT = a Labor share in sector 
Secondary sector 
YB Output 
NB Labor force 
YB/NB = B Output per worker 
A(YB/NB) Change in output per worker 
NB/NT = b Labor share 
Tertiary sector 
Yc Output 
Nc Labor force 
Yc/Nc = C Output per worker 
A(Yc/ Nc) Change in output per worker 
Nc/NT = c Labor share 
Total region 
YT Output 
NT Labor force 
YT/NT Output per worker 
A(YT/NT) Change in output per worker 
Note: Definitions of  sectors are given in Table 6.  Definition of the Metropolitan Mexico City region is 
given in Table 15. 
1950s and 20 times as much in the 1960s (Tables 18 and 20). Clearly, the 
Northern states have retained the lead in rural output per worker by 
pursuing capital- and land-intensive techniques or irrigated farming. As such 
they could be regarded as southerly extensions of "Sunbelt" agriculture in the 
USA, using much the same technology and cropping patterns and exporting a 
considerable share of their output to the USA. Hence, this pattern of Border 
productivity growth in the primary sector, as in the secondary sector, is 
closely linked to the US economy. 
In the tertiary sector, the Border region has also shown major 
productivity growth rising from 38 percent in the 1940s, to  59 percent in the 
1950s, and to 54 percent in the 1960s of the region's growth in output per 
TABLE 20 Output, employment, and total factor productivity growth in the 
Rest of Mexico region, 1940-70. 
1940 1950 1960 1970 
Primary sector 
YA Output (value added in 3 734 6 654 4890 11 123 
million 1950 pesos) 
NA Labor force (PEA x lo3) 3 082 3 881 4089 4318 
YA/1vA = A  Output per worker 1212 1715 2419 2 576 
(1 950 pesos) 
A(TA/NA) Change in output per worker 5 03 704 157 
over past decade 
(1 950 pesos) 
NA/NT = a Labor share in sector 0.746 0.696 0.632 0.567 
Secondary sector 
YB Output 2 608 5 526 7443 16 379 
NB Labor force 457 755 956 1398 
YB/NB = B Output per worker 5 706 7319 7786 11716 
A(YB/NB) Change in output per worker 1613 467 3930 
NB/NT = b Labor share 0.1 11 0.135 0.148 0.184 
Tertiary sector 
Yc Output 3 462 5 795 9505 21866 
Nc Labor force 593 939 1428 1 897 
Yc/Nc = C Output per worker 5 838 6 171 6656 11527 
A(Yc/Nc) Change in output per worker 333 485 4871 
Nc/NT = c Labor share 0.144 0.168 0.221 0.249 
Total region 
YT Output 9 804 17 975 26838 49368 
NT Labor force 4 132 5 575 6 473 7 613 
YT/NT Output per worker 2373 3224 4 146 6 485 
A(YT/NT) Change in output per worker 85 1 922 2339 
Note: Definitions of  sectors are given in Table 6. Definition of the Rest of Mexico region is given in Table 
15 .  For Total Mexico see Table 6 ,  which is the sum of  Tables 18, 19, and 20. 
worker (Table 21). Its employment share has also risen from 24 percent in 
1940 to 42 percent in 1970. This is strong evidence that the sector has exerted 
a demand pull on employment sufficient to prevent steady increases in employ- 
ment from swamping productivity growth. The most interesting contrast is 
with tertiary sector productivity in the other main receiving region 
(Metropolitan Mexico City) which grew more rapidly than that .of the Border 
in the 1940s and 1950s but which lagged behind the Border region in the 1960s 
(Tables 18 and 19). Here again, the Border region, which is heavily engaged in 
service-related trade (tourism) with the USA, now leads the whole nation in its 
growth of output per worker. Over half of that leadership stems from 
productivity growth in the tertiary sector. (See Table 18 and Chapter 4). 
TABLE 21 Sectoral and shift elements underlying growth in output per 
worker in the Border region, 1940-70. (A11 nonpercentage figures represent 





Total growth of output 





Total growth of output 





Total growth of output 





Total regional growth 
of output per worker 
(1950 pesos) 
Share of regional 
productivity growth 
attributable to shift 
factor 
Note: Definitions o f  sectors are given in Table 6 .  Figures are calculated from data in Table 18. Methods 
are discussed in Chapter 3 and in Table 7 .  
The second region in productivity growth and the leader in labor 
absorption is Metropolitan Mexico City (Tables 19 and 22). This region is by 
definition almost 9 0  percent urban, and its service sector has accounted for 
most of its productivity growth in the 1940s (over 100 percent) and 1960s 
(75 percent). In the 1950s the growth of import-substituting industries led 
the  way with 57 percent as mentioned above. The pattern of growth in this 
region provides support for the hypothesis that "push" factors are beginning 
t o  have a retarding effect on Mexico's productivity growth as labor is forced 
TABLE 22 Sectoral and shlft elements underlying growth in output per 
worker in the Metropolitan Mexico City region, 1940-7O.(A11 nonpercentage 
figures represent 1950 pesos per worker.) 
194G50 % 195G60 % 196G70 % 
Primary sector 
AAa (Sectoral) 10 115 7 
A (Shift) - 99 - 110 - 75 
AaAA (Combined) - 2 - 40 - 2 
Total growth of output - 9 1 - 4 0 - 3 5  - 1 - 7 0  - 1 
per worker (1950) 
Secondary sector 
ABb - 798 1895 1752 
AbB 77 1 682 - 148 
AbAB - 217 499 - 46 
Total growth of output - 244 - 107 3076 57 1558 27 
per worker (1950) 
Tertiary sector 
ACc 387 23 14 3055 
AcC 164 54 965 
AcAC 11 20 346 
Total growth of output 562 247 2388 44 4366 7 5 
per worker (1950 pesos) 
Total region 
CAYn - 401 4324 4814 
ZAn Y 836 626 742 
ZAnAY - 208 479 298 
Total regional growth 227 100 5429 100 5854 100 
of output per worker 




Note: Definitions of sectors are given in Table 6.  Figures are calculated from data in Table 19. Methods 
are described in Chapter 3 and in Table 7. 
into the tertiary sector which, after remaining at a fairly constant 45 percent of 
employment in the first two decades, rose to 51 percent in the 1960s (Table 
19). Still output per worker in the tertiary sector continued to grow in the 
1960s, though evidence from Chapter 1 would suggest that if the decade could 
have been divided into 5-year intervals, that trend might well have been 
declining. The probable slowdown is likely to  have continued into the 1970s 
as a flood of immigrants failed t o  find adequate employment opportunities 
in the overcrowded Valley of Mexico. The drastic deceleration in productivity 
TABLE 23 Sectoral and shift elements underlying growth in output per 
worker in the Rest of Mexico region, 1940-70. (All nonpercentage figures 
represent 1950 pesos per worker.) 
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Note: Definitions of  sectors are given in Table 6 .  Figures are calculated from data in Table 20. Methods 
are described in Chapter 2 and in Table 7 .  
growth in manufacturing and agriculture almost certainly will have repercus- 
sions on income and job multipliers in the service sector of this region, exacer- 
bating relative pressures for migration to  the Border and other growth centers. 
Hence if policies were adjusted to favor decentralized growth, they might well 
find a favorable labor response, though as shown in Chapter 5 absolute gaps in 
output per worker still favor Metropolitan Mexico City. 
Finally, the Rest of Mexico (Tables 20 and 23) deserves attention since 
the 23 states that make up this region account for almost twclthirds of the 
TABLE 24 Regional and sectoral shifts as a share of Mexican productivity 
growth (%). (Based on the division of Mexico into 3 regions.) 
Shift 1940-50 195&60 196&70 
1. Regional shift as a share of 20 
productivity growth in Mexico 
2. Sectoral shift as a share of 5 1 
productivity growth 
3.  Internal migration among the 13 19 22 
3 regions as a share of growth 
in the economically active 
population 
SOURCE: Tables 18-23 and Chapters 5 and 6. 
Mexican labor force (1970). Here too the pattern is disturbing. Although 57 
percent of the labor force remained in the primary sector in 1970, that sector's 
share of regional productivity growth, which had been one-third in the 1940s 
and 1950s, became negative in the 1960s (Table 23). Manufacturing on the 
other hand showed signs of regional dispersion, as its share of employment rose 
from 11 percent in 1940 to 18 percent in 1970. Here again, however, the 
tertiary sector took the lead with a 60 percent contribution to overall 
productivity growth in the 1960s. It is likely that without significant labor 
emigration from the Rest of Mexico to the Metropolitan Mexico City and the 
Border regions, the productivity growth in the Rest of Mexico would have 
lagged still more. The output per worker in agriculture in that region was only 
about one-fourth that of the Border region, though its service sector 
productivity was one-half that of the Border. Clearly, it is the tertiary sector in 
which productivity "leveling" is occurring, and it is this sector that deserves 
much more research than it has received, given its patterns of employment, 
distribution of output, and income trends. 
In conclusion, the shift factor is declining as a contributor to productivity 
growth, both regionally and sectorally. Meanwhile, the share of migration 
among regions, as a proportion of growth in the labor force, is on the increase 
(Table 24). This indicates that while workers are increasingly moving to higher 
productivity regions in search of employment. those regions are less capable of 
sustaining their role as transmitters of growth through shifts in the labor force. 
A squeeze is coming between migratory pressures for higher income and the 
potential of leading regions to provide jobs. Indeed, it is likely that rather than 
passing on productivity gains, migration is now dampening such growth in the 
leading sectors and regions. Mexico is in danger of becoming a low income and 
low productivity "service economy" in contrast to the USA whlch is attempt- 
ing to  maintain its position as a high income "service economy". The 
consequences are a sharpening of the disparities in the standards of living and 
quahty of life between the two countries, disparities that exacerbate pressures 
for migration northward to  bridge the gap that has not yet been narrowed 
through trade and investment flows or  technology transfers. The emerging 
pattern is different from the 1940s, when according to our data, there was 
more hope. During the 1940s the internal shift factor accounted for one-half of 
productivity growth. Migration within Mexico offered promise of a better life, 
and the regional shift accounted for up to one-fifth of national productivity 
growth (Table 24). But by the 1960s sectoral shifts were at most responsible 
for only one-sixth and regional shifts for one-tenth of national productivity 
growth. The new petroleum windfall may provide an economic surplus that 
could be allocated to favor basic regional and sectoral productivity growth. 
This might reverse historical trends. But to do so, every effort must be made 
t o  assure that the new oil rents are not simply redistributed as consumption 
subsidies, artificially causing service sector employment to rise still further, 
nonpetroleum exports t o  decline, and imports of consumer goods to expand 
disproportionately. Fundamental changes are needed in the incentive structure 
of the economy. These changes should favor true productivity growth in the 
nonpetroleum primary sector, in manufacturing, and in agriculture, together 
with expansion of wage good production to serve the mass of the Mexican 
population. 
NOTES 
1. The Human Settlements and Services Area's research in urbanization and development 
is concerned with simulation modeling and counterfactual analysis of alternative 
patterns of demographic and economic growth, urbanization, and regional migration 
under conditions of alternative rural technologies, income distribution, and demand 
patterns, and implications of the foregoing for the provision of social services (Rogers 
1978). This research is inspired by the importance of issues underlying current debates 
between those criticizing alleged "over-urbanization" of developing countries and 
those supporting present patterns of urbanization and migration as means of improving 
social welfare. Demographic influences on migration are of course of considerable 
importance to economic growth, and the outcome will, in an iterative fashion, affect 
the future growth of population, welfare, and migration. By breaking into this 
sequence of behavior to look at the structure of output and employment and its 
changes over time at the national level and by sector and region, for a single important 
case, the Mexican Case Study seeks to provide empirical evidence on both costs and 
benefits of rapid demoeconomic changes. The resettlement of important segments of 
the work force has been an essential element in this study. 
2.  A more explicit statement of the theoretical framework used follows. The foundation 
of the section is taken from production theory and uses the implicit production 
function 
Y = A(t)f(K, L,  R) (1) 
where Y is the total value added or GDP; f is a function having the neoclassical 
properties of being homogeneous of degree one and twice differentiable; and A(t,  is 
the socalled efficiency term which is a function of time and independent of the 
factors of production. Changes of this term are considered to reflect the effects of 
technological change, and they serve to shift the production function without altering 
its basic structure. Therefore the term is considered as neutral technological change. 
The term can adopt the form 
A ( t )  = A(0)eAt 
where h is a parameter. Explicitly what we have in the paper is 
Therefore, the following observations are in order 
(a)A(o) = 1 
(b) AT = t 
(c) f adopts the form of a Cobb-Douglas production function. The purpose of this 
section is to  determine by means of equation (2) the percentage of change in output 
attributed to variation in the quantity and quality of inputs. To illustrate, we can 
differentiate equation (1) totally with respect to time and obtain 
We know that under competitive conditions (one of the implicit assumptions in the 
- '- i + a - + b - +  L K R  c -  
L A L K R  
or in discrete terms 
AY AA AL AK AR 
- - - + a - + b - + c -  
Y A L  K  R 
Since A  is not observable, it is found as a residual 
AA AY AL AK AR 
- -  - - - a - - b - -  C -  
A Y L  K R  
3. These factor shares are based on estimates for the period 1 9 4 0 4 5  taken from the 
author's earlier study (Reynolds 1970) in which the labor share includes mixed income 
("ingresos mixtos") of small business and farm households. There is some likelihood 
that in the years since 1965 the labor share has declined serving to lower this 
coefficient. 
4. It should be noted that the post-1960 GDP series was somewhat revised since the 
Reynolds (1970) volume was published, and the present study incorporates these 
changes, causing the results for earlier years to be slightly different from earlier esti- 
mates. 
5. The 1960 census PEA (economically active population over 12 years of age) was 
reported to be 11 235 x lo3. Altirnir adjusted this figure to 10213 x lo3. The 
agricultural population was most affected by this downward adjustment: the census 
PEA in agriculture for 1960 of 6086 x lo3  being reduced by Altimir to 5048 x lo3. If 
the census figures for 1960 (6086 x lo3) and 1970 (5329 x lo3) are compared, it 
appears that the rural PEA declined sharply in absolute terms. Yet as Altimir shows, 
this is not consistent with sample surveys taken in 1963, 1964, and 1965 that showed 
rural labor participation rates to be close to the 1970 levels and much below those of 
1960. Clearly, Altimir's adjustments for 1960 when disaggregated are crucial. 
regionally, to the analysis of migration and sectoral and regional labor absorption 
in Mexico between 1950 and 1970. On the basis of the uncorrected 1960 census data, 
the degree of labor flow from rural to urban areas is seriously understated for the 
1950s and overstated for the 1960s. The Altimir adjustments resulted from a 
thoroughgoing examination of coverage, definition, measurement and other problems 
of the population censuses of 1950, 1960, and 1970. His research was done under the 
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Regional and Urban Development Project at El Colegio de Mexico. Altimir argues 
convincingly that the PEA reported in the 1960 census was seriously overestimated, 
the upward bias being concentrated in the rural labor force through over counting 
of unrenumerated family workers and agricultural wage labor in 1960 relative to that 
of the 1950 and 1970 censuses. His conclusions are supported by a comparison of the 
respective population censuses of 1950 and 1960 (which also report rural employ- 
ment) and by an El Colegio de Mexico reestimate of the 1960 PEA based on a 1.5 percent 
sample of 1960 census cards. As mentioned above, his major adjustment was to reduce 
the PEA in the agricultural sector (which includes cattle, forestry, and fishing) in 1960 
from 6089 x lo3 to 5048 x lo3. Altimir does not give statewide breakdowns for these 
adjustments by sector, but he does report the adjusted PEA by state for 1960. Since 
the overall total downward adjustment was concentrated in the primary sector, I 
applied the difference in state PEA from the census and Altimir's estimates entirely 
to the primary sector of the respective state. Only in the case of the state of Mexico 
and the Federal District of Mexico did this method lead to spurious results (negative 
employment in the rural sector). In those two cases instead of using the above method, 
I reduced primary sector employment by the same proportion as that of the Rest of 
Mexico allocating the remainder as a proportioned reduction to the rest of the states. 
6. The capital stock in 1959 was assumed to be 331 124 million pesos (at constant 1960 
values) to which an assumed 5 percent depreciation rate was applied. To this figure 
were added gross investment flows in 1960 of 33 132 million pesos, producing an 
estimated capital stock at the end of 1960 of 347 700 million pesos (this would have 
meant a capital/output ratio (Kt-1 /Yt)  for 1960 of 2.2. 
7. Continual revisions of the national accounts make it difficult to get a secure fix on the 
level or trend of income and product in Mexico. For example, earlier data implied 
trends in GDP for the 1940s of 6.4 percent to 6.7 percent per annum (Reynolds, 
1970) compared to 5.8 percent in Table 2 (Solis 1970; Unikel 1976). Official revisions 
that have appeared since the Unikel study lower the growth rate for the 1960s from 
7.2 percent to 6.8 percent per annum. In order to keep estimates in this chapter as close 
as possible to those in the following chapters (which rely on Appendini (1974)-Unikel 
(1976) regional gross product estimates that are linked to the Solis (1970) GDP 
data at the national level), I have retained the Solis figures for GDP growth in the 
1940s and 1950s. However, estimates for 1960- 1976 provided by the Bank of Mexico 
in 1977 differ significantly from Solis's earlier figures. Thus, it is necessary to adopt 
the Bank of Mexico's data for the 1960s, despite the fact that thev lower the growth 
rate (and residual) during that decade by 0.4 percent per annum. The turnaround in 
productivity growth since the mid-1960s is independent of the choice of GDP esti- 
mates for the 1960s. 
8. Hewitt's 1960 figure (Hewitt 1976) is derived from CIDA (1964: Vol. l),  and the 
source of the 1960 figure is not clearly cited. Her figures for growth of cultivated 
land between 1940 and 1960 are comparable to those presented in Reynolds (1970), 
justifying a linking of her 1960 to 1970 figures to the earlier index. 
1940-50 (%) 1950-60 (%) 1960-70 (%) 
Hewitt (1976) 3 .O 1 .O 2.1 
Reynolds (1976) 3.6 1 .O N.A. 
9. 1n my 1970 volume, estimates of the unexplained productivity residual showed a 
decline between the 1940s and 1950s, from 3.3 percent per annum to  2.5 percent per 
annum, respectively, as compared with the reverse trend in Table 2 (from 2.5 percent 
to  2.7 percent). The later results are due primarily t o  a downward revision of output 
growth in the 1940s (GDP in constant 1950 pesos) based on the GDP estimates 
(Solis 1970) presented in Appendini (1974tUnikel (1976). Labor force growth in 
the 1950s has also been sharply reduced in the present study drawing on the more 
recent downward revision of the 1960 census figures by Altimir (1974). The growth 
in PEA based on official census data between 1950 and 1960 was 3.1 percent per 
annum (Reynolds 1970: 50, Table 1.7). 
10. The primary sector receives emphasis as a source of out-migration. Regional 
differences in agricultural productivity, which in Mexico reflect severe contrasts 
between irrigated agriculture in the North and Pacific North (or Border states) and rain- 
fed agriculture (principally in the Center, Gulf, and South, i.e., Rest of Mexico states), 
leading to different paths of employment and income among the regions of Mexico. 
The tertiary sector is focused on as a buffer that absorbs labor displaced from rural 
areas. In Mexico the tertiary sector also evidences wide differences in employment and 
productivity growth by region. The tertiary sectors o r  the Border and Metropolitan 
Mexico City regions absorb much labor displaced from the primary sector both in 
those regions and in the Rest of Mexico region. 
11. This is a generalized version of the shift-share model for three sectors presented in 
Reynolds (1970: 64ff) designed to accommodate any number of sectors and regions. 
Its characteristics are discussed in detail in that study. 
12. The sustained high value of output per worker in the tertiary sector, exceeding that of 
the secondary sector in all four years (Table 6), deserves comment. Since this sector 
aggregates a number of activities of very different productivity, from banking and 
finance to domestic services and street vendors, it disguises a large and growing dualism 
in Mexico as elsewhere. While productivity is growing in the modern tertiary sector, 
reflecting a high and growing rate of capital formation and technological progress in 
modern commerce, transport, and services, it is almost certainly stagnating or perhaps 
even declining in the traditional tertiary sector, which serves as a major buffer for 
workers migrating from the rural areas of Mexico. Hence, further analysis of this 
problem should attempt to differentiate between tertiary activities that are capital 
intensive and those that are labor intensive. It is likely that some of the shift factor 
attributable t o  the tertiary sector is in fact own productivity growth in the modern 
tertiary sector rather than increased employment as in the traditional tertiary sector. 
In addition the methodology used for estimation of value added in some of the 
tertiary sector activities, such as commerce and services, is extremely crude 
(application of a coefficient to value added in other production sectors) and leads to 
possible biases in either direction, while employment figures are taken from the 
decennial censuses and bear no relation to the value added estimates in the national 
accounts. It is quite possible that value added is overestimated for these components 
of the tertiary sector. Also, value added for the large and growing public sector is a 
simple reflection of government wages and salaries and bears no necessary relationship 
to physical productivity. It has been suggested, on the other hand, that the nature of 
highly protected manufacturing in Mexico has led to a lower level of productivity and 
slower rate of productivity growth in the secondary sector than would have been 
obtained under a more internationally competitive system. This should be offset by 
the consideration that value added in manufacturing is distorted upward by the degree 
of effective protection of its products, while value added in the primary and tertiary 
sectors is subject to a proportional downward bias. In short, it is not possible to net 
out the effects on output per worker in the three sectors of statistical and policy- 
related (price) distortions. For that reason the value added estimates from the national 
accounts are used without adjustment. 
13. In subsequent chapters regional patterns of productivity growth in the service 
(tertiary) sector are examined. It is shown that the regional performance of this sector 
is quite diverse, and that the shift element is an important contribution within the 
tertiary sector as well as between it and the primary sector. These initial findings 
support the need for far more detailed research on the service sector, with special 
attention to its role in labor absorption in Mexico (Souza and Tokman 1976; Reynolds 
and Leiva 1978). It is quite likely that the pattern of productivity growth within the 
tertiary sector is even more unbalanced than between it and other activities. Growth 
in output per worker in services tends to occur in the more capital- and skill-intensive 
subsectors, which are least likely to absorb job seekers displaced in increasing numbers 
from the rural areas. Unfortunately, the data used in this paper do not easily 
accommodate disaggregation of the tertiary sector. A more detailed study of the 
output and population censuses might permit such an analysis to  be made at both the 
national and regional levels for at least some of the subsectors. This research could 
then be combined with a sectoral analysis of budget study data plus interviews of small 
businesses and other activities in the informal sector. The rarely characterized "urban 
informal sector" is a nontrivial consideration and may be said to include self- 
employed, workers and owners of small businesses, workers receiving relatively low 
incomes and those outside of the social security system, or other categories, depending 
upon the choice of criteria of the observer. There seems t o  be a strong overlap between 
conventionally defined informal sector employment and that of subsectors of the 
tertiary sector, but all sectors of production have been found to have important 
elements of informal sector employment (Souza and Tokman 1976). 
14. This study draws on the statewide breakdown of CDP data in Unikel(1976), which is 
based on work by Appendini for the years 1940, 1950, and 1960. It also draws on 
estimates by the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crkdito Pliblico, Direccibn de Programacibn 
y Descentralizacion Administrativa, Subdireccion de Programacion Fiscal, for 1970, 
which appear in Unikel (1976). Labor force data for 1940, 1950, and 1970 are 
estimated on the basis of the respective population censuses as described in Unikel 
and Torres (1970). The data for 1960 have been further adjusted by Altimir's 
agricultural labor force estimates for 1960 (Altimir 1974). 
15. The figures in Table 19 show a significant decline in output per workers in the 
Metropolitan Mexico City region during the 1940s. If correct, they suggest that labor 
absorption dominated the growth of secondary production in that period, while 
capital-intensive growth characterized the 1950s and 1960s. 
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